Table of Contents
Articles
| Monotone threshold representations Mira Frick |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 757–772 |
| The importance of being honest Nicolas Klein |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 773–811 |
| The formation of networks with local spillovers and limited observability Michael David König |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 813–863 |
| Condorcet meets Ellsberg Andrew Ellis |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 865–895 |
| A search-theoretic model of the term premium Athanasios Geromichalos, Lucas M. Herrenbrueck, and Kevin D. Salyer |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 897–935 |
| Negotiation across multiple issues Gabrielle Gayer and Dotan Persitz |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 937–969 |
| Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 971–1004 |
| Many-to-many matching and price discrimination Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1005–1052 |
| Innovation vs. imitation and the evolution of productivity distributions Michael König, Jan Lorenz, and Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1053–1102 |
| Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information William Fuchs, Aniko Öry, and Andrzej Skrzypacz |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1103–1144 |
| Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences Sylvain Chassang and Christian Zehnder |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 114 |
| Innovation vs. imitation and the evolution of productivity distributions Michael König, Jan Lorenz, and Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1053–1102 |
Papers to appear
The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.
- Timo Hiller, Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation (Supplementary appendix)
- Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra, Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Kevin Cooke, Preference discovery and experimentation
- Ziv Hellman and Yehuda Levy, Bayesian games with a continuum of states
- Takeshi Momi, Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
- David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal, and Bruno Sultanum, Preventing bank runs
- Andreas Hefti, Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications (Supplementary appendix)
- Fuhito Kojima and Takuro Yamashita, Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
- Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, Ngo Long, and Markus Poschke, Capital-labor substitution, structural change and growth
- Mohammed Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Haomiao Yu, and Yongchao Zhang, On the equivalence of large Individualized and distributionalized games
- Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya, General revealed preference theory
- Pablo D. Azar and Silvio Micali, Computational principal agent problems
- Ryota Iijima and Yuichiro Kamada, Social distance and network structures (Supplementary appendix)
- Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers, and Ronald Wolthoff, Competing with asking prices
- Hervé Moulin, One dimensional mechanism design
- Brendan Daley and Philipp Sadowski, Magical thinking: A representation result (Supplementary appendix)
- Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky, Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring (Supplementary appendix)
- Juan Ortner, A theory of political gridlock
- Daniel Fragiadakis and Peter Troyan, Improving matching under hard distributional constraints (Supplementary appendix)
- Tugce Cuhadaroglu, Choosing on influence
- Wei He, Xiang Sun, and Yeneng Sun, Modeling infinitely many agents
- Henrique de Oliveira, Tommaso Denti, Maximilian Mihm, and Kemal Ozbek, Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs
- Wonki Jo Cho and Biung-Ghi Ju, Multinary group identification
- Juan Ortner, Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs (Supplementary appendix)
- Marek Pycia and M. Utku Ünver, Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (Supplementary appendix)
- Claudio Mezzetti and Ludovic Renou, Repeated Nash implementation
- Mark Dean and Pietro Ortoleva, Allais, Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging
- Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber, Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
- Toru Suzuki, Directives, expressives, and motivation
- Lixin Ye and Chenglin Zhang, Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry
- Marcin Konrad Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal, How do you defend a network?
- Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki, On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games
- Brian Baisa, Auction design without quasilinear preferences
- Alessandro Bonatti and Johannes Hörner, Career concerns with exponential learning
- Péter Eső and Balázs Szentes, Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem (Supplementary appendix)
- René Kirkegaard, A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems (Supplementary appendix)
- Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, and Rann Smorodinsky, Job security, stability and production efficiency
Current Issue: Volume 11, Issue 3 (September 2016)